I occasionally use this blog to say various negative things about Brazilian education. It’s worth taking a minute to look at the reality some teachers face in the classroom while trying to educate deeply underprivileged children.
João is a six-year-old who studies in a public school in the center of a small city in the interior of Bahia. His teacher has already taught some of his numerous older brothers and sisters and has a good idea about his difficult family situation. His family can’t afford to buy new clothes, and few days ago he showed up at school in pants so tight that he couldn’t zip them up. Every time he came back to the bathroom, class had to be stopped so the teacher could help him out. He often has no breakfast to eat before he goes to school. While he’s there, he’s unable to pay attention and spends a good portion of his time yawning loudly to get the teacher to look at him. When the teacher asks him if he knows why he shouldn’t engage in certain proscribed behaviors, he gives a well-rehearsed answer that he learned at home: “Because God’ll punish me.” When the teacher asks him why he needs to get a good education, the answer is equally practiced: “They’ll take away our welfare (Bolsa Família)”.
Recently, he showed up at school bursting with pride because he’d done homework for the first time. But when the teacher looked, he’d only written his name on it, and left the rest of the sheet blank. When the teacher asked why, he explained, “My mom didn’t know how to help me.” The activity had been to write the first letter before each word, along the lines of putting the “A” before “pple”.
It’s tough to imagine that a teacher, no matter how good, would be able to help him keep up with his better-off cohort, fully equipped as it is with breakfasts and literate moms. Long before children set foot in their very first classroom, a crucial part of the difference between private and public education in Brazil has already been put in place.
segunda-feira, 5 de março de 2012
FHC interview in The Economist
For those that learn about Brazil reading books from the US or the UK (say, The Forgotten Continent by The Economist's Michael Reid, or the duo of books from 2010, The New Brazil and Brazil on the Rise, reviewed elsewhere in this blog), former president Fernando Henrique Cardoso typically comes off quite well. Before entering the presidency, he was the man that solved Brazil's inflation problems. While in office, he made some reforms that have turned out well by some measures, like the privatization of state-run companies has turned tax dollar-draining duds into global powerhouses (including Vale and Embraer). He also started several social programs (that have since been rebranded by his competitors) and got the ball rolling to try to improve Brazil's dismal public education. He spent years abroad after becoming a persona non grata for opposing the dictatorship, and is an accomplished academic with a PhD in sociology.
He had some faults too - there was undoubtedly some level of corruption in his privatizations, and his second term in office was unsuccessful (though perhaps this can be attributed to a lack of sufficient corruption - he didn't buy off congress to support his agenda).
In Brazil itself, evaluations of the former president are far from universally positive. In Bahia, a stronghold of his opponents in the Workers Party, he is detested by a large part of the population, often irrationally so; my wife refuses to use academic books with his name on them, even if they'd be useful for a college paper. As far as I can tell, the chasm between the international view of FCH comes down to two important points that separate Brazil from the US and UK - identity politics as practiced in Brazil, and a culture of training people to use the word "neoliberal" a lot, and with great disdain, about people that try to reform Brazil's bloated government.
In the case of identity politics, Brazilians consider FHC to be arrogant and out of touch with common people. He may well have a fantastic ego, and his professorial demeanor can be offputting to some. Like any politician that wants to survive, he spins things to be favorable to him, and wants to convince the world that his contribution was important. On the other hand, he is probably just as often the victim of spin against him. He once argued that a serious problem in education was the fact that teachers are the lowest-level professionals - that is, that teachers are typically people that can't get a better job. He's completely right, but the statement was turned into an attack on teachers by his opponents, who spun the statement to mean that teachers are a bunch of lazy bums. To this day, he is dispised by a large contingent of Brazilian teachers (explaining the misunderstanding of his statement does nothing to alleviate the hatred).
Personally, I don't care very much for identity politics. As for the charge that FHC gave the country away to foreigners, Brazil is profiting still from changes he and others brought about (but most people are attributing economic growth to Lula instead). So, though I try to maintain a healthy skepticism, and by default consider any Brazilian politician corrupt, I tend to more or less see FHC as the international press does.
Take a look at the current interview with him in the Economist - it's mostly politics with only a bit of information about Brazil's economic development (regarding economic development, the most interesting part is perhaps some quick mentions of the rising middle class in Brazil and how it is more market-oriented and less dependent on government, which might herald changes further down the road). But he comes off as a pretty reasonable guy. He takes credit for Brazil's recent success (such as when he mentions that everyone was afraid of Lula undoing all the progress "he" had made), but he is also anxious for new leaders to step in. He admits to mistakes. He might criticize Lula and other opponents, but he does so reservedly and rationally.
Contrast this with Lula's interview in the New Yorker some months ago (which I summarized in another entry), in which Lula spends the entire time insisting that black is white - his bungles are actually the pride of others, inventions of others never existed, everything before him was doomed to failure.
You probably shouldn't draw too many conclusions about real presidential performance based on their interviews, but then again, if so many people love Lula and hate FHC becase of their personality differences, why can't you make an equally superficial judgement?
He had some faults too - there was undoubtedly some level of corruption in his privatizations, and his second term in office was unsuccessful (though perhaps this can be attributed to a lack of sufficient corruption - he didn't buy off congress to support his agenda).
In Brazil itself, evaluations of the former president are far from universally positive. In Bahia, a stronghold of his opponents in the Workers Party, he is detested by a large part of the population, often irrationally so; my wife refuses to use academic books with his name on them, even if they'd be useful for a college paper. As far as I can tell, the chasm between the international view of FCH comes down to two important points that separate Brazil from the US and UK - identity politics as practiced in Brazil, and a culture of training people to use the word "neoliberal" a lot, and with great disdain, about people that try to reform Brazil's bloated government.
In the case of identity politics, Brazilians consider FHC to be arrogant and out of touch with common people. He may well have a fantastic ego, and his professorial demeanor can be offputting to some. Like any politician that wants to survive, he spins things to be favorable to him, and wants to convince the world that his contribution was important. On the other hand, he is probably just as often the victim of spin against him. He once argued that a serious problem in education was the fact that teachers are the lowest-level professionals - that is, that teachers are typically people that can't get a better job. He's completely right, but the statement was turned into an attack on teachers by his opponents, who spun the statement to mean that teachers are a bunch of lazy bums. To this day, he is dispised by a large contingent of Brazilian teachers (explaining the misunderstanding of his statement does nothing to alleviate the hatred).
Personally, I don't care very much for identity politics. As for the charge that FHC gave the country away to foreigners, Brazil is profiting still from changes he and others brought about (but most people are attributing economic growth to Lula instead). So, though I try to maintain a healthy skepticism, and by default consider any Brazilian politician corrupt, I tend to more or less see FHC as the international press does.
Take a look at the current interview with him in the Economist - it's mostly politics with only a bit of information about Brazil's economic development (regarding economic development, the most interesting part is perhaps some quick mentions of the rising middle class in Brazil and how it is more market-oriented and less dependent on government, which might herald changes further down the road). But he comes off as a pretty reasonable guy. He takes credit for Brazil's recent success (such as when he mentions that everyone was afraid of Lula undoing all the progress "he" had made), but he is also anxious for new leaders to step in. He admits to mistakes. He might criticize Lula and other opponents, but he does so reservedly and rationally.
Contrast this with Lula's interview in the New Yorker some months ago (which I summarized in another entry), in which Lula spends the entire time insisting that black is white - his bungles are actually the pride of others, inventions of others never existed, everything before him was doomed to failure.
You probably shouldn't draw too many conclusions about real presidential performance based on their interviews, but then again, if so many people love Lula and hate FHC becase of their personality differences, why can't you make an equally superficial judgement?
domingo, 26 de fevereiro de 2012
Anthropology of Pilar
Having conducted a thorough anthropological survey of the mining town Pilar, a district of the municipality of Jsguarari, I am in a position to reveal the following results:
-If you park your car in the shade of a tree, you risk a goat climbing onto your roof to eat the tree leaves. This can scratch your car.
-All those donkeys that appear to not belong to anyone actually don't belong to anyone. They wander around, graze on the meager caatinga grass, and occassionally pose danger to unaware motorists. They're fun to point out to children, especially when a baby donkey is following its mother around. But as beasts of burden, their value is now so low that people seem to just let them loose. Pilar has decent salaries for the region and is very isolated, so the automobile has taken over.
-Pilar was a company town built from scratch in the 1980s. The designers built the houses with one window in the front for peons, two windows for engineers, and four windows for managers. I'm not sure it would have been more expensive to make the peon houses slightly wider and less deep, allowing for more windows but a similar house size overall. But in any case, to this day if you tell someone you have a new house in pilar, they will immediately ask how many windows it has - since the models are almost all the same, this tells them everything they need to know about the house, except how you've decorated it.
-Miners suffer a lot, what with spending all day underground and risking their lives in case of collapse, but the ones performing the most difficult and dangerous tasks can retire after 15 year of service. Yes, 15 years! Since most rank and file miners don't go to college, they start pretty young. One I know is on pace to retire at age 35, at which point he can go back to school while earning a full pension and, if god wills it, pursue a musical career. Doesn't seem like such a bad deal. Someday I'll try to visit a real working mine to experience how awful it is and get a sense of whether it's really worth it or not.
There's a lot more interesting things to say about Pilar, but I doubt I'll ever get around to them.
-If you park your car in the shade of a tree, you risk a goat climbing onto your roof to eat the tree leaves. This can scratch your car.
-All those donkeys that appear to not belong to anyone actually don't belong to anyone. They wander around, graze on the meager caatinga grass, and occassionally pose danger to unaware motorists. They're fun to point out to children, especially when a baby donkey is following its mother around. But as beasts of burden, their value is now so low that people seem to just let them loose. Pilar has decent salaries for the region and is very isolated, so the automobile has taken over.
-Pilar was a company town built from scratch in the 1980s. The designers built the houses with one window in the front for peons, two windows for engineers, and four windows for managers. I'm not sure it would have been more expensive to make the peon houses slightly wider and less deep, allowing for more windows but a similar house size overall. But in any case, to this day if you tell someone you have a new house in pilar, they will immediately ask how many windows it has - since the models are almost all the same, this tells them everything they need to know about the house, except how you've decorated it.
-Miners suffer a lot, what with spending all day underground and risking their lives in case of collapse, but the ones performing the most difficult and dangerous tasks can retire after 15 year of service. Yes, 15 years! Since most rank and file miners don't go to college, they start pretty young. One I know is on pace to retire at age 35, at which point he can go back to school while earning a full pension and, if god wills it, pursue a musical career. Doesn't seem like such a bad deal. Someday I'll try to visit a real working mine to experience how awful it is and get a sense of whether it's really worth it or not.
There's a lot more interesting things to say about Pilar, but I doubt I'll ever get around to them.
sexta-feira, 17 de fevereiro de 2012
Trade zig-zag
For those who favor more open trade (like Dr. John Welch - see Brazil Under Dilma Taskforce Report below), Brazil took a giant step back when it implemented a 30% tax increase on imported vehicles at the end of 2011. The measure was a cheap response to the strengthening real, which threatened local manufacturing as more people began to spring for better imported cars. Locally manufactured cars are fantastically expensive in Brazil, at over twice the price of the same car in any country that doesn't tax the bejebus out of manufactured goods.
Now, the government has taken a small step forward again by announcing a partial repeal, according to Bloomberg. After complaints, especially from Chinese manufacturers, the Brazilian government is now reducing taxes for foreign companies that are planning investment in local manufacturing in Brazil, and claiming a victory for having provided a srong incentive for foreign investment.
On the other hand, taxes, rather than improvements in productivity, are still the go-to tool to deal with competition problems. The deeper issue of a horrible tax regime, which is regressive and provides poor incentives, is also unlikely to receive the treatment it deserves in the near future.
Now, the government has taken a small step forward again by announcing a partial repeal, according to Bloomberg. After complaints, especially from Chinese manufacturers, the Brazilian government is now reducing taxes for foreign companies that are planning investment in local manufacturing in Brazil, and claiming a victory for having provided a srong incentive for foreign investment.
On the other hand, taxes, rather than improvements in productivity, are still the go-to tool to deal with competition problems. The deeper issue of a horrible tax regime, which is regressive and provides poor incentives, is also unlikely to receive the treatment it deserves in the near future.
quinta-feira, 16 de fevereiro de 2012
The Brazilian CEO's dream
An interesting survey of over five thousand executives seems to show a particular aspect of Brazilian business culture. According to business magazine Exame, the dream destination of Brazilian executives is Brazil's state-run petroleum giant Petrobrás. While the company is legendary for its investment in training and opportunities for advancement (all well as government benefits), the downside is serious as well - the link between performance and remuneration is a bit weak. Employees that perform well can't look forward to bonuses. On the other hand, lazy employees are unlikely to get fired, and the magazine reports that Petrobras cut only 0.05% of its workforce in 2011.
The article concludes that Brazilian workers, or at least those over 25, seem to prefer stabiity and to guard against potential losses, rather than maximize potential financial gain or working in an environment that value efficiency. A friend of mine who is captain of a petroleum ship has given me an idea of the kind of inefficiency to be expected; lack of respect for oil delivery schedules (apparently fatal in the oil industry), a willingness to send boats out without ensuring they'll have something on board for the return trip (wasted trips deal a severe blow to profit margins) and a lack of planning that leaves him without ever knowing, or being able to tell his family, whether he'll be back for the holidays or not.
Will todays 25-year-olds change their mind as they age and become responsible for families, or do they represent a generational difference that heralds more appetite for risk in the future? Check back in ten years for the answer.
The article concludes that Brazilian workers, or at least those over 25, seem to prefer stabiity and to guard against potential losses, rather than maximize potential financial gain or working in an environment that value efficiency. A friend of mine who is captain of a petroleum ship has given me an idea of the kind of inefficiency to be expected; lack of respect for oil delivery schedules (apparently fatal in the oil industry), a willingness to send boats out without ensuring they'll have something on board for the return trip (wasted trips deal a severe blow to profit margins) and a lack of planning that leaves him without ever knowing, or being able to tell his family, whether he'll be back for the holidays or not.
Will todays 25-year-olds change their mind as they age and become responsible for families, or do they represent a generational difference that heralds more appetite for risk in the future? Check back in ten years for the answer.
terça-feira, 14 de fevereiro de 2012
Brazil rates worst for public expenditures
A couple weeks ago, an organization called the Brazilian Institution for Tax Planning (IBPT) released the results of its 30-country survey, which measured the return that citizens get for the money they are taxed. Brazil, as you may know, has an impressively high tax rate for a developing country at 34.4%, significantly higher than that of the US and the highest in the Americas. For that reason, and also because the group is probably an anti-tax group of some sort (no time to look it up now!), it should be no surprise that Brazil came in dead last. The survey included neighbors Argentina and Uruguay. Notably, it doesn't seem to include too many other low-income countries, which I take as a sign that this is an anti-tax group that wanted the data to show Brazil in last place. Be that as it may, it is still an effectively dramatic way of highlighting Brazil's inefficiency.
The same story repeats itself in microcosm when you look into specific areas of public services in Brazil. You can fill in the blank in the sentence below with almost anything (education, health, security):
Brazil lags in ________, despite the fact that it spends more as a percentage of GDP than comparable developing countries.
As a result, Brazilians pay either one time (taxes) and get a bad deal, or if they have a high enough income, they pay a second time to buy private education, health and security that actual works.
Though there are no shortage of academics and newspapers and other organizations that insist that the time to change these policies and make them fairer is now, the typical Brazilian on the street isn't likely to protest over these issues. Taxes are often hidden, especially in the prices of manufactured goods, which may be part of the reason that organizations have to work so hard to get the issue of taxes and inefficiency in the news (especially comparing with the United States, which, despite being rated as very efficient, has to content with a large swath of the population that thinks that any tax at all is akin to tyranny, no matter how well spent).
In a lame reply on Globo News, the government argued that the results didn't take into account the effect of social spending like Bolsa Familia.
You can find some more interesting information from IBPT here.
The same story repeats itself in microcosm when you look into specific areas of public services in Brazil. You can fill in the blank in the sentence below with almost anything (education, health, security):
Brazil lags in ________, despite the fact that it spends more as a percentage of GDP than comparable developing countries.
As a result, Brazilians pay either one time (taxes) and get a bad deal, or if they have a high enough income, they pay a second time to buy private education, health and security that actual works.
Though there are no shortage of academics and newspapers and other organizations that insist that the time to change these policies and make them fairer is now, the typical Brazilian on the street isn't likely to protest over these issues. Taxes are often hidden, especially in the prices of manufactured goods, which may be part of the reason that organizations have to work so hard to get the issue of taxes and inefficiency in the news (especially comparing with the United States, which, despite being rated as very efficient, has to content with a large swath of the population that thinks that any tax at all is akin to tyranny, no matter how well spent).
In a lame reply on Globo News, the government argued that the results didn't take into account the effect of social spending like Bolsa Familia.
You can find some more interesting information from IBPT here.
sexta-feira, 10 de fevereiro de 2012
The Brazil Under Dilma Taskforce report
John H. Welch, an economist and economic strategist with an impressive résumé for his work in and regarding Brazil, has written an interesting report just released, avaliable here. The idea of the report is to dig into Brazil's economic situation and determine whether, after one year in office, President Dilma will be likely to reform the economy, leave it be, or take it back in time to the "failed policies of the 1970's".
Key takeaways:
-In Welch's view, the current Brazilian administration's view of inflation is wrong. Currently the finance minister insists that rising inflation is the result of supply shocks, that will work themselves out as supply expands without monetary intervention. However, Welch purports to show (or perhaps does show - not being an economist I can't really say how right he is) that it is in fact demand-driven, implying that the failure to raise interests rates could result in a continuation of the internal consumption boom and thus worsening inflation.
-The author also pans the 2011 decision to raise taxes on imported cars as a response to the rising value of the real (and thus the falling price of imports in reais), rather than addressing underlying competitivity problems. The same goes for Brazil's newfound habit of accusing China of dumping. For Welch, the opening of trade since the 1990s has been so important to Brazil's recent success that these recent anti-trade positions threaten to scupper the country's gains. He calls for more privatization of the economy as well.
-Finally, government spending falls under his sites - though Dilma has made some attempts to reign in Brazil's ever-increasing budget, it seems it won't be enough for the country to maintain a budget surplus and invest in infrastucture if more aggressive action isn't taken. Welch calls for social security reform (passed under Lula in 2003 but never implemented - and also which I wrote about in a bit more detail recently), but also supports Dilma's attempts to suppress increases in the minimum wage. On the other, savings and investment are simply too low to support solid growth in the future. After some economic wizardry, Welch contends that Brazil is not likely to manage its goal of a 4.5% GDP growth rate in the coming years.
After some positive and negative points, the reader gets the impression that more of the same can be expected. Brazil will grow, but won't risk serious reform to really meet its potential.
Key takeaways:
-In Welch's view, the current Brazilian administration's view of inflation is wrong. Currently the finance minister insists that rising inflation is the result of supply shocks, that will work themselves out as supply expands without monetary intervention. However, Welch purports to show (or perhaps does show - not being an economist I can't really say how right he is) that it is in fact demand-driven, implying that the failure to raise interests rates could result in a continuation of the internal consumption boom and thus worsening inflation.
-The author also pans the 2011 decision to raise taxes on imported cars as a response to the rising value of the real (and thus the falling price of imports in reais), rather than addressing underlying competitivity problems. The same goes for Brazil's newfound habit of accusing China of dumping. For Welch, the opening of trade since the 1990s has been so important to Brazil's recent success that these recent anti-trade positions threaten to scupper the country's gains. He calls for more privatization of the economy as well.
-Finally, government spending falls under his sites - though Dilma has made some attempts to reign in Brazil's ever-increasing budget, it seems it won't be enough for the country to maintain a budget surplus and invest in infrastucture if more aggressive action isn't taken. Welch calls for social security reform (passed under Lula in 2003 but never implemented - and also which I wrote about in a bit more detail recently), but also supports Dilma's attempts to suppress increases in the minimum wage. On the other, savings and investment are simply too low to support solid growth in the future. After some economic wizardry, Welch contends that Brazil is not likely to manage its goal of a 4.5% GDP growth rate in the coming years.
After some positive and negative points, the reader gets the impression that more of the same can be expected. Brazil will grow, but won't risk serious reform to really meet its potential.
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